Critical Questions on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Tell me a little bit about the frameworks that you use to determine the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards and non-proliferation policies.

IAEA Safeguards is based on Article III.1 of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-proliferation Treaty, NPT). The NPT is considered to be the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as it is the most adhered-to treaty in the world and has restricted the development of nuclear weapons since its launch. The NPT requires all non-nuclear weapon States to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material in the State in peaceful activities and to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) with the IAEA. The NPT and in consequence the provisions of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (based on INFCIRC/153) thus form the basis and framework of nuclear safeguards. Past cases (e.g. Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons programme) have exposed the weaknesses of CSAs and led to the strengthening of IAEA safeguards, which resulted in additional measures based on existing legal authority (for example, the introduction of environmental sampling) or additional legal authority, as laid down in the Additional Protocol of 1997. The Additional Protocol strives to close all gaps identified in CSAs. It requires expanded declarations to be submitted to the IAEA and allows IAEA inspectors to have expanded access on nuclear sites and beyond. Unfortunately, the case of Iran, which is enriching uranium to almost weapons-grade levels without any obvious civilian application, shows that States can move very closely to nuclear weapons capabilities under the umbrella of a “peaceful nuclear programme”. Whether Iran will eventually become the 10th nuclear weapon State or not will not depend on the effectiveness of nuclear safeguards but solely on a political decision for or against it.

What challenges have you  encountered in improving the nuclear safeguards system to support global non-proliferation efforts. How have you addressed them during your time at the IAEA and WiN for Peace?

No individual, including myself, is in a position myself to improve the current nuclear safeguards system. The IAEA has objective safeguards measures in place and continuously upgrades techniques and equipment to improve the nuclear safeguards system. So, IAEA Safeguards are not static but develop over time. The major challenge in my opinion is the current geopolitical situation, where one of the P-5 States has “gone rogue”, ignores its previous commitments and long-established global norms, threatens a non-nuclear weapon State with nuclear weapons, and has occupied a nuclear power plant, which poses a major risk to the safety, security and safeguards system. 

WiN for Peace was founded in early 2023 in order to bring more women into nuclear safeguards, non-proliferation, export controls and disarmament, with the ultimate objective of making this world a more peaceful place. WiN for Peace main objective is to educate women in the above subject areas by conducting webinars and other activities. So, WiN for Peace is not geared towards, or has authority to, improving the nuclear safeguards system.

Could you share your assessment of current global non-proliferation policies in African countries? In your opinion, how effective are these policies in addressing challenges in nuclear security?

Almost all 54 countries on the African continent have signed the NPT and brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force. Since most of them have no or very limited nuclear activities, they have so-called Small Quantities Protocols in force, as long as certain limits of nuclear material in such States are not exceeded. South Africa was the only country in the world to give up its nuclear weapons programme. The African continent is also a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone under the Treaty of Pelindaba, with the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) in charge of overseeing the implementation of the treaty. The Treaty also requires all States to maintain the highest standards of physical protection of nuclear material, facilities and equipment, which are to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. I therefore believe that, in view of the above, the non-proliferation policies of African countries are generally excellent. In order to adequately address nuclear security challenges, African countries will need to have national systems in place (e.g. laws and regulations, a regulatory body) in order to implement those policies.

Drawing from your tenure at the IAEA, what principles of international collaboration bolster global nuclear safeguarding? What improvements do you anticipate or advocate for?

During my tenure at the IAEA, I worked as an IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Inspector, inspecting countries in Africa, North America and the Middle East, including Iran. The IAEA nuclear safeguards system is based on the provisions of the NPT and the comprehensive safeguards agreement subsequently concluded between a State and the IAEA. The principles of international collaboration would be the will to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by all countries in the world. Unfortunately, the NPT, as successful as it has been, has created a system between the Have’s (the five nuclear weapon States recognized by the NPT) and the Have-nots (all the other States that have joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States). And there are the three countries outside the NPT (Israel, India and Pakistan) plus the only State that ever withdrew from the NPT (the DPRK). As long as there is no progress on the provisions of Article VI of the NPT (nuclear disarmament) and as long as those four States stay outside the NPT, it becomes obvious that States perceive nuclear weapons as indispensable and highly desirable. I advocate for a world free from nuclear weapons, where we all can live in peace without the constant threat of total annihilation. In the current geopolitical environment, however, such a world is difficult to imagine today. I do hope, however, that one day we will realize that constant wars, and in particular a nuclear war, are in the way of our development as mankind. I hope that more and more States will realize this and be willing to cooperate on making such a dream reality. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a step in the right direction.

What measures can international policies take to balance nuclear technology innovation with continued strict compliance with non-proliferation terms to uphold global security?

The rapid technological developments, including those of nuclear technologies, can bring about many benefits to mankind but, if uncontrolled, can also result in undesired and destructive effects. There are international mechanisms in place to control the export and import of nuclear technologies (e.g. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 that requires all States to establish national nuclear export controls, or the adherence to the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines). However, those mechanisms are slow. Moreover, in the case of novel dual-use technologies, it is very difficult to determine as of when a new technology needs to be controlled, or to determine the exact control parameters to be applied in practice. Therefore, nuclear export controls usually lag behind reality and the gap is getting even bigger. A way out would be closer cooperation between the developers of novel technologies that could be used in the nuclear field and those that control such technologies and to speed up the development of control parameters. Closer cooperation between all States in the area of nuclear export controls would also be desirable, such as the exchange of information between the exporter and the importer.

What are the most pressing ethical considerations, in your view, when developing nuclear technologies? How do you believe that regional influences shape these considerations?

In my opinion, the most pressing ethical considerations when developing nuclear technologies are whether those technologies could only be used for peaceful purposes or whether they could also be misused for non-peaceful purposes. As we know from its inception, nuclear technology is dual-use (i.e. it may be used for peaceful and military purposes), so I expect most new nuclear technologies to be dual-use as well. This means that their use will require strict controls to prevent their misuse. The most ethical considerations for the developers would be whether any new technology should be developed just because it can be developed, no matter the impact of that technology, and to allow for an open assessment of that impact. Regional alliances may have an impact on such developments, for example the development of new drones by Iran and its supply to Russia for their use in the war on Ukraine; or the regional alliances surrounding the war in Ghaza. Perceptions may also differ depending on such regional alliances and regional influences.

As the leader of WiN for Peace,  how do initiatives like Women in Nuclear contribute to the advancement of non-proliferation efforts and international cooperation? What gender-based considerations can be made to optimize this advancement?

Women in Nuclear is a support network for professional women (and men) working in the many different applications of nuclear technologies, including nuclear non-proliferation. Women in Nuclear also cooperates with other entities in this area (for example the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management). The female perspective in non-proliferation is important as women are the source of life and by nature strive for good relationships and collaboration. Gender-based policies and international collaboration are therefore of utmost importance for the advancement of non-proliferation efforts. 

Looking forward, what trends do you foresee in nuclear security? How might these trends begin to sway nuclear security initiatives as we know them?

I foresee that the rapid technological progress, also in the nuclear field, will have a major impact on nuclear security, both in a positive and a negative sense. In a positive sense, such progress may improve the application of nuclear security measures at nuclear facilities. In a negative sense, such progress may foster misuse of new technologies and undermine current nuclear security measures. Therefore, each major technological development will need to be assessed from a nuclear security perspective and nuclear security professionals need to be trained how to respond adequately and in a timely manner to such developments.